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ROBERT E. BARTEAUX,
Petitioner/Appellant,

*
it
it

vs.

*
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE
*
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, it
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT
it
SECURITY,
*

Case No.

900099-CA

Priority No. 6

Respondent/Appellee.
*
it

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2) (a) (1987).

This is an appeal from a

final order of the Utah Industrial Commission, after a formal
adjudicative proceeding.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Was the Administrative Law Judge's finding of fact that the
appellant intended to take the employer's property and convert it
to

his

own

use without

permission

supported

by

substantial

evidence? Did the employer meet his burden of proof to show just
cause for discharge?
of an overpayment?

Was the appellant at fault in the creation

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES. REGULATIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Administrative Code §§ R475-5b(l) and R475-6e; Utah Code
SS 35-4-5(b((l), 35-4-6(d) and 63-46b-l et seq.
STATEMENT OF CASE
On August 28, 1989 Robert E. Barteaux was discharged from his
job as a cashier at Little America. He was granted unemployment
compensation benefits, and the employer appealed. After a hearing
before an administrative law judge on September 29, 1989, the
initial decision was reversed. It was held that the employer had
just cause for discharge and that the claimant was at fault in
creating an overpayment. The claimant timely appealed this decision
to the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission. On January 16 ,
1990, the Board of Review, in a two to one decision, affirmed the
determination of the administrative law judge. The claimant then
timely appealed to this court.
The discharge was the result of a single incident where the
claimant moved four small plants having a total value of $6.00 from
one location on the employer's property to another (Tr. 29). There
had been no prior disciplinary actions taken against the claimant
or problems with his performance (Tr. 24).
The claimant had taken a walk around the employer's large
property, as he often did, during a work break (Tr. 31-32). He
again noticed the four small plants which had been sitting in their
flats for two months (Tr. 31). Originally there had been many flats
of plants stored there, but most had already been planted (Tr. 23).
The claimant looked around for a maintenance man to see if he could
2

get permission to hdvi- ui buy the plants,, but he could find no one
(Tr. 3 1 ) . So he put the plants in a shoebox ami

walked toward the

fron t of the property. He placed the plants on a fountain and was
approaching

the

trout

entrance when

hi?« wa.« confronted

Stoner, who was in charge of security, M.OIIH'1

by

Mr,

lift'I observed

the

claimant picking up the plants and walking toward the front of the
property, and had rushet

intercept him. But the claimant

no longer was in possession of the plants
thdl

:

•-

. <*. -^lit testified

he wa'-' quinq in look for someone -^ 91 *>e him permission to

take the plants and had not left them

thexr original location

because he didn't want to hcive to walk <:. i the back
parking lot

*u 1 he l,» IMMII

I "Ti: , 32) .

There is conflicting testimony cone turning whether the claimant
initially denied knowing where the plants were when confronted by
SLciiiei: .ri?nl whether the plants were concealed. Stoner stated that
the claimant initially denied knowing WIMI. 31 oner was talking about
and that the plants were concealed underneath a bush (Tr. 2 6 ) . The
claimaii
were (Tr.

hat he did not denying knowing where the plants
:. a*Hj T mat they were c.1 ear] y vi sible (Tr. 32)
risih of this evidence the administrati ve law

judge

iiiarit intended "to remove the plants from the
employer's

property,

and conver t: them

1.0 his own

u&e

without

obtaining permission" (Tr. 42) . He held the claimant to be ,
HI

ill** ciedliuii 1 1 .ui overpayment

because

he

lied

aboir

his

intentions when he applied tor benefit;,' ( 1 -j. | The Hoard of Review #
while noting that it was "somewhat troubled by the severity of the
3

penalty, for what might be considered a minor infraction" (Tr. 61),
affirmed. The dissenting board member found that the employer
overreacted and that termination was not justified (Tr. 62).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue of whether there was just cause for discharge is a
mixed question of law and fact, and therefore an intermediate
standard of review is appropriate for this question. Pro-Benefit
Staffinq. Inc. v. Board of Review. 110 Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Ct. App.
1989). The inferences drawn from the operative facts and the
application of the law to these facts must be reasonable and
rational.

Id.

Findings

of

fact

only

need

by

supported

by

substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Grace Drilling
Company v. Board of Review. 110 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (Ct. App. 1989).
Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. at 36.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The employer has the burden of proof to show just cause for
discharge. That burden was not met in this case. First, there is
not substantial evidence that the claimant intended to remove the
plants from the employer's property without permission. Second,
the actions of the claimant do not constitute just cause for
discharge because they were not sufficiently culpable. Finally,
the determination that the claimant was at fault in creating an
overpayment is not reasonable or rational.

4

ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE RECORD AS A WHOLE DOES NOT PROVIDE SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE THAT THE CLAIMANT INTENDED TO REMOVE THE
EMPLOYER'S PROPERTY WITHOUT PERMISSION.

The evidence supporting the finding that the claimant intended
to remove the plants from the employer's property is weak. And it
relies entirely on the testimony of Mr. Stoner, since Mr. Box,
claimant's supervisor, did not see where the plants were and did
not hear the claimant purportedly initially denying knowledge of
their whereabouts (Tr. 24). Though Stoner stated that the claimant
initially said "I don't know anything about any plants" (Tr. 26)
and that the plants were "underneath a bush" (Id.), it is clear
that he had already assumed that the claimant was stealing the
plants when he ran to the front of the property. It should also be
noted that the claimant was not charged with a crime, and that
initially the employer claimed that the claimant violated company
policy (Tr. 6, 11), and yet failed to introduce any such policy
into evidence.
The claimant testified that he did not deny knowing where the
plants were and that they were clearly visible (Tr. 31-32). He
denied that he intended to take them without permission, and had
in fact set them down on the employer's property and was attempting
to enter the building (Id.). A reasonable inference is that he was
in fact going to seek permission to take the plants. If he wanted
to steal them it would have been more reasonable to take them
directly to his car. It is also difficult to believe that he was
being as secretive as the employer claimed about four virtually
5

worthless

plants

that

had

been

sitting

for

two

months

and

apparently were not going to be used* Even if he did initially
feign

lack

of

knowledge

of

their

whereabouts,

this

is

understandable given his being confronted by the head of security
while looking for a maintenance worker. The conclusion that the
claimant intended to steal the plants is not reasonable given the
evidence as a whole.
POINT II. THE EMPLOYER DID NOT MEET ITS BURDEN OF PROOF TO SHOW
JUST CAUSE FOR DISCHARGE.
In order for there to be just cause for discharge separation
must be necessary due to the actual or potential harm to the
employer. Utah Administrative Code § 475-5b-101. The employee must
have conducted himself with a sufficient degree of callousness,
misbehavior,

or

lack of consideration

that

the employer

was

justified in firing him. Id. Not every cause for discharge provides
a basis to deny benefits. Id.
In order for just cause to be shown the employer has the
burden

of

proof

to

show

that

the

claimant's

actions

were

sufficiently culpable. The discharge must have been necessary to
avoid

actual

or

potential

harm

to

the

employer's

rightful

interests. Id. at § R475-5b-102 1. a. If the conduct was an
isolated incident of poor judgment and there is no expectation that
the conduct will be continued or repeated, potential harm may not
be shown and therefore it is not necessary to discharge the
employee. Id. Where the employee has historically complied with
work rules, a single violation, even if harmful, does not require

6

discharge. Id.
In this case the employer suffered little or no harm from the
claimant's actions. The plants were worth virtually nothing, and
they had been sitting all summer and were unlikely to be used, the
claimant did not actually steal them. He moved them from one
location to another on the employer's property. He had historically
complied with the work irules and there was no evidence of any
problems with his performance. Even if he should have asked
permission before moving the plants, this hardly constitutes more
than an isolated error of poor judgment.
It is instructive to compare the degree of culpability in this
case with other cases interpreting these rules. In Kehl v. Board
of Review, 700 P.2d 1129 (Utah 1985), a one-time violation of
safety rules was culpable conduct because of the extreme potential
harm to the employer's interests. The claimant violated rules
dealing with transporting explosives across a railroad track. Less
potentially damaging behavior has always been found not to be
culpable. In Lane v. Board of Review, 727 P.2d 206 (Utah 1986), the
claimant violated state law by selling beer to a minor. This was
held to not be culpable conduct because it was an isolated error
of

poor

judgment.

In Wright's

Furniture

Mill

v.

Industrial

Commission of Utah, 707 P.2d 113 (Utah 1985), the claimant was a
truck driver who was arrested on a DUI violation which made him
uninsurable. This was held to not be culpable conduct. In Spartan
AMC/Jeep v. Board of Review, 709 P.2d

395

(Utah 1985), the

claimant's actions were held not to be culpable even though he
7

purportedly admitted taking some antifreeze and cabinet doors for
his own use without permission as well as failing a polygraph
examination

regarding

other

thefts.

Claimant's

actions

are

significantly less severe than the nonculpable actions of these
other claimants.
The administrative law judge and the Board of Review also
relied on the purported erosion of trust and confidence in the
claimant to perform his

job, which

involved handling money.

However, it is difficult to see how such an erosion was the fault
of the claimant or why it is especially relevant. In Dept. of the
Air Force v. Dept. of Employment Security. 125 Utah Adv* Rep. 54
(Ct. App. 1990) f the claimant admitted to selling cocaine. He was
not charged with a crime because he cooperated with authorities.
Here trust and confidence had surely "eroded", and the claimant
violated specific rules of the employer. The issue was whether
there was actual or potential harm to the employer's rightful
interests, and whether it was necessary to discharge the employee
to protect those interests. Neither of these requirements are met
in the case at bar, even if it is affirmed as a finding of fact
that the appellant intended to remove the four plants for his own
use without permission.
POINT III. THE DETERMINATION THAT THE CLAIMANT WAS AT FAULT IN
CREATING AN OVERPAYMENT IS NEITHER REASONABLE
NOR RATIONAL.
The administrative law judge held that the claimant was at
fault

in creating

information

an overpayment

as to his

because

he

provided

false

intention to take the plants without
8

permission. The Board of Review failed to address this issue (see
Tr. 60-62), even though it was raised on appeal (Tr. 51).
Utah Code Ann. § 35-4-6 requires that the claimant be at fault
in the creation of his overpayment. Messersmith v. Board of Review,
36 Utah Adv. Rep. 43 (1986). On his statement of job discharge the
claimant stated that he was fired for taking some plants (Tr. 2),
that it was for "taking property not belonging to me (Tr. 3). The
claimant's longer statements list the facts in accurate detail (Tr.
5, 7-9). The Department granted benefits because there was no theft
(Tr. 9), and not due to any inaccurate information from the
claimant. Therefore, the claimant was not at fault in the creation
of an overpayment.
If this court rules that the finding of fact concerning the
claimant's intent is not supported by substantial evidence, then
there is no evidence of a false statement by the claimant, and thus
no fault in the creation of an overpayment. If this court finds for
other reasons that the employer has not met its burden of proof to
show just cause for discharge, then even if there was a false
statement it would not be material.
CONCLUSION
The Department of Employment Security's finding of fact that
the appellant intended to steal some plants from his employer is
not supported by substantial evidence. This, in itself, means that
the employer failed to meet its burden of proof to show just cause
for discharge. For other reasons the administrative law judge and
the Board of Review misapplied the law concerning just cause
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discharge and fault overpayment to the pertinent facts in the case.
Appellant therefore respectfully requests that this court reverse
the decisions of the Department of Employment Security holding that
the appellant was discharged for just cause and that he was at
fault in the creation of an overpayment.
DATED this / ^

day of

3u/t<

, 1990.
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